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ABSTRACTS
In Islam, ethics (akhlaq) is inseparable from religion and is built entirely
upon it. Naturally, therefore, the Qur’an and the Sunnah are the ultimate
sources for Muslim ethics. The books on adab (good manners) and makarim al-
akhlaq (noble qualities of character), which have embodied the earliest works
on ethics in Islam demonstrate the extant to which they utilize the Qur’an and
the Sunnah. However, early Muslim discussions on ethical philosophy, such
as those by al-Kindi (d. 874), al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn Sina (d. 1037), did
not attain to the status of a discipline though invariably serving as an
introduction to their wider studies on politics, law and other fields of
knowledge. Miskawayh (d.1030), through his famous ethical work on ethics,
Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, was the first Muslim moralist to have separated ethics
from other disciplines, offering a very thorough analytical system of Islamic
ethics. Thus, this qualitative study which applies conceptual content analysis
method seeks to make a critical survey of the development of ethical thought
in Islam.
Keywords: ethics, Islamic ethics, Miskawayh and Tahdhib al-Akhlaq
Akhlak dalam Islam: Suatu Tinjauan Kritis
ABSTRAK
Dalam Islam, etika (akhlaq) tidak dapat dipisahkan daripada agama malah
terbina berteraskan Islam sepenuhnya. Maka al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah sudah
tentu sekaligus menjadi sumber rujukan tertinggi kepada akhlak Islam. Buku-
buku tentang adab (budi pekerti yang baik) dan makarim al-akhlaq (akhlak-
akhlak mulia), yang mendominasi karya-karya awal bidang akhlak dalam
Islam menunjukkan bahawa al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah telah dimanfaatkan
secara meluas oleh tulisan-tulisan tersebut. Walau, bagaimanapun, beberapa
diskusi awal tentang falsafah akhlak oleh tokoh-tokoh Islam seperti oleh al-
Kindi (m. 874), al-Farabi (m. 950) dan Ibn Sina (m. 10370, masih tidak
mencapai status sebagai suatu disiplin ilmu yang tersendiri, sekalipun
berperanan sebagai pendahuluan kepada kajian mereka dalam pelbagai
bidang ilmu pengetahuan lain seperti politik, undang-undang dan lain-lain.
Miskawayh (m.1030), melalui karya beliau yang sangat famus dalam bidang
akhlak, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, merupakan moralis Islam yang pertama berjaya
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memisahkan akhlak dari bidang-bidang disiplin ilmu lain, di samping berjaya
memperkenalkan suatu sistem pemikiran akhlak yang cukup analisis. Justeru
itu, kajian kualitatif ini, yang mengaplikasikan metode analisis kandungan,
akan membuat suatu tinjauan kritis terhadap perkembangan pemikiran akhlak
dalam Islam.
Kata kunci: akhlak, akhlak Islam, Miskawayh dan Tahdhib al-Akhlaq
INTRODUCTION
The term khuluq (character) is definitely Qur’anic, so that it antedates
Greek terms in the Islamic world such as  ethos. Of the two occasions
of its occurrence in the Qur’an, the more often cited is, “and you
(Muhammad) have an exalted level of character (khuluq)” (68:4).
It denotes the meaning of one’s innate individuality such as
character, natural disposition, temper, nature, manners, and even
one’s customs and religions (See, Jamil Saliba 1971, I: 49; and Ibn
Manzur, II: 1244-1248). The term khuluq (its plural: akhlaq), which
usually occurs in the expression makarim al-akhlaq (noble qualities
of character), appears to be very popular in the titles of many books
that deal particularly with religious ethics in Islam, such as the
Makarim al-Akhlaq of Ibn Abi al-Dunya (d. 894).
In classical Islam, khuluq, was normally defined as a state of
the soul which determines human actions. This state is neither the
soul nor the action, since the soul is innate, while character is a state
of the soul that causes the soul to perform its actions. The state is
acquired by training and practice, while the soul is inborn and part
of man’s nature. That is to say, the soul represents an ontological
structure – not indeed a thing but something as real (and real in the
same way), whereas character is something that can be described as
a human achievement.  One can be said to “make” one’s character
but one has one’s soul by virtue of one’s existence.
It was al-Farabi (d. 950), who was among the earliest great
Muslim philosophers to acknowledge the interrelation of the state
of the soul with human action, for he stresses: “The states of the
soul by which a man does good deeds and fair actions are the virtues,
and those by which he does wicked deeds and ugly actions, are the
vices” (al-Farabi 1961: 27; and 1985: 54-55). Then, his Christian
student, Yahya Ibn `Adi (1924: 8-9) took a similar view, defining
khuluq as, “a state of the soul by which man performs his actions
without thought or deliberation”. Yahya’s definition is in agreement
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with that of his contemporary, Miskawayh (1966: 31), who also
defines khuluq as, “a state of the soul which causes it to perform its
actions without thought or deliberation”. Almost the same definition
of character is later elaborated by successive writers on ethics in the
Islamic world, such men as al-Ghazali (1976, III: 68), Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi (1978: 39-40), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1964: 35-36), al-
Dawwani (1839: 30-31; 38-39), and others.
 ‘ILM AL-AKHLAQ (ETHICS OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY)
It is this state of the soul, i.e., character (khuluq), that has become
the subject matter of Muslim ethics. Its scope and contents given by
al-Ghazali (1909: 34; 1982, III: 60-62), which seem to have been
universally accepted by philosophers up to his day, may serve as an
example:
“The professors of this (ethics) occupy themselves with defining the attributes
and qualities of the soul, grouping them according to genus and species, and
pointing out the way to moderate and control them”.
al-Ghazali’s specific description of the science of ethics is
attested later by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1964: 35), who writes:
“Now this species (of philosophy: ethics), with which we shall begin, is a
science concerned with how the human soul can acquire a disposition such
that all its acts, proceeding from it by its will, may be fair and praiseworthy.
Thus, the subject-matter of this science is the human soul, in as much as from
it can proceed, according to its will, acts fair and praiseworthy, or ugly and to
be condemned”.
Ibn Sadr al-Din al-Shirwani as cited by Hajji Khalifa (1835-
1858, I: 200), takes much the same view and summarises:
“Ethics is the science of the virtues and the way to acquire them for the welfare
of the soul; and of vices and the way to guard the soul against them.  Thus, its
subject-matter is the innate state of the soul, aptitudes, and the rational soul as
far as it is affected by them”.
The identification of character (khuluq) with a state of the human
soul was pioneered by Aristotle. In almost all of his major works on
ethics, Ethica Nicomachea, Magna Moralia, and Eudemian Ethics,
Aristotle repeatedly states that things that exist in the soul are of
three kinds: passions or feelings, faculties or capacities, and habits
or states of character. By passions, Aristotle (1980: 35) further
elaborates:
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“I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred,
longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied my
pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be
capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling
pity; by states of character (khuluq) the things in virtue of which we stand
well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we
stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately;
and similarly with reference to the other passions”.
Aristotle (1985: 1935), also thinks that in virtue of this state of
character, man has a tendency to do either good or bad. Or to put it
another way, it is man’s actions that indicate the hidden nature of
such a state (Aristotle 1985: 1875). But the interaction between this
state of character and human action, widely accepted by the Arabic
writers on ethics, is a concept derived almost verbally from Galen.
For instance Galen (1973: 25) writes:
“A trait of character (al-khuluq) is a state of the soul that induces a man to
perform the actions of the soul without consideration or precise knowledge.
An illustration of that is that some people, when surprised by a terrible sound,
are frightened and shocked, and that when they see or hear amusing, they
laugh involuntarily; they often wish to refrain from this, but they are unable to
do so”.
Character, then, as it is understood by Muslim writers on ethics,
is a state (hal) of the soul by which man does his action without any
reflection or fresh thought. Some moralists, however, leave this
conception of character without further clarification. Miskawayh
(1966: 31; 1917: 52), the  famous  Muslim moralist in contrast,
goes far beyond both Aristotle and Galen and says further that this
state of the soul is not yet called “character” (khuluq) unless it
becomes a relatively permanent disposition of man which produces
a stable or a single type of behaviour in all or most situations. Thus,
it is wrong to call a man greedy on one occasion and generous on
another, unless the act of either greediness or generosity has become
stable and relatively permanent to him, then he deserves to be called
such (Miskawayh 1951: 199). Yet this state of character, Miskawayh
adds (1966: 31; and 1951: 85-86. See also al-Tusi 1964: 74; and al-
Dawwani 1839: 38-39), should also induce a man to do an action
spontaneously until it grows into a habit and second nature. So that
all his activities are performed freely and easily without any need
for further reflection and thought.  Man, therefore, is largely
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governed by habit, and after some time, he no longer able to
transform his habit by any act of reflection and deliberation; but
that habit becomes his disposition and represents a trait of his
character.
Miskawayh (1966: 31,126-127), further develops that character
is neither the capacity, nor the soul, nor even the action.  It is not the
capacity, faculty, or power, for it is not right to call anyone a good
or a bad man simply because one has the power or capacity to do
good or evil.  But only he whose goodness or badness has developed
into a habit is rightly to be called a man of good or bad character.
Neither is character the soul, for the soul is innate, while character
is a state of the soul that causes it (the soul) to perform its actions.
The state is acquired by training and practice, while the soul is inborn
and part of man’s nature.  Hence, character is either good or bad;
the soul is neither.
Character is also different from action.  Character, as we have
just learned, is the internal and the hidden state of the soul, while
action is its outward manifestation.  Character is the inward cause,
while the action is its outward consequence.  A good character hence
begets good actions, whereas bad character yields bad actions.
Hence, he who persistently enjoys giving away his wealth, for
example, is called a man of generous character.  His acts of giving
are called actions, while the thing that makes his soul to do such a
generous act is called “character” (khuluq) (See Miskawayh 1966:
1,3,31)
Thus character, as al-Farabi (1961: 32) has said, has no name.
It is neither a virtue nor a vice, but a seat of both.  If there proceeds
from it only a single type of action, either virtues or vices, it may be
called virtue or vice accordingly (Compared also Aristotle 1985:
1875; Galen 1973: 28; and Miskawayh 1966: 126-127, 191-193).
But this is simply due to homonymy, not that the real nature of the
one is the nature of the other.  Therefore, it is because of character
that man is either praised or blamed. It is because of character that
he is either happy or in misery. Consequently character has
consistently become the object of the science of ethics. In Arabic,
this science is called,  ‘ilm al-akhlaq (ethics or moral philosophy),
its name similarly indicating that khuluq or character is the object
of its enquiry.
It is this state that has likewise become the subject matter of
the works on ethics in Islam, for example by al-Kindi (d. 874), al-
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Razi (d. 925), al-Farabi (d. 950), Yahya Ibn ‘Adi (d. 974), Miskawayh
(d.1030), al-Ghazali (d.1111), al-Tusi (d.1274), al-Dawwani (d.1502)
and others. The two major works on ethics, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, by
Yahya Ibn ‘Adi and Miskawayh, for example, are the books that
aim at assisting mostly future philosophers in achieving excellent
states of character such that all actions proceeding from them may
be good and praiseworthy (Yahya 1978: 68, 70; and Miskawayh
1968: 5, 11, 64-65, 82). These states, as Aristotle (1985: 1935) has
illustrated, are those from which “men have a tendency to do the
best action, and through which they are in the best disposition
towards what is best; and best is what is in accordance with right
reason, and this is the means between excess and defect relative to
us”. For Yahya (1978: 68) and Miskawayh (1966: 92) alike believe
that only by means of possessing noble character traits does man
become human, share the ranks of the angels, and eventually and
especially, attain the highest goal of his existence, that is happiness.
Khuluq or character, then, refers to the state of the soul, which
induces man to perform his actions, whereas ‘ilm al-akhlaq (ethics
or moral philosophy) is the science that khuluq or the state of the
soul, i.e., character, becomes the object of its enquiry.  Since the
soul itself possesses different faculties and aptitudes, and a noble
state of the soul (or character), is realisable only through the total
equilibrium and harmony of all of these powers of the soul, ethics is
viewed, especially, by the Muslim ethicists as the science of the
human soul. It defines the characteristics and qualities of the soul as
well as the methods of how to control and moderate them.  So that
happiness, the supreme goal of ethics, may become possible to man
(See further, al-Razi 1978: 35-37; Yahya 1978: 109-119; Miskawayh
1966: 51-55, 91-91; al-Ghazali 1978: 173-178; al-Tusi 1964: 35-
37; and al-Dawwani 1839: 52-57). Thus, the primary subjects of
Muslim ethics comprise the following (Hourani 1985: 15-22; and
Donaldson 1953: 96-120):
i. The good for man: i.e. virtues and happiness of the soul;
ii. The three faculties of the soul and their effects on character;
and
iii. The theory of self-control or the refinement of character through
knowledge, discipline and association with people, so that the
soul may become free from vices, attaining human perfection
and complete happiness.
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However, the ultimate reference of Qur’anic ideal is happiness
in the world to come (al-Qur’an 11: 105, 108), which is contingent
upon the purification of the soul from vices:  “By the soul, and the
proportion and order given to it; and its enlightenment as to its wrong
and its right; truly he succeeds that purifies it; and he fails that
corrupts it” (al-Qur’an 91: 7-10). And because this purification can
only be actualised by means of ethico-religious knowledge, beliefs
and practices, ethics thus occupies the central place in Islam. Other
subjects, such as politics and economics, are connected with ethics
basically either in a supportive role or as its background. This is
referred to, for example, in the Qur’an, verse 2: 177:
“It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards East or West; virtuous,
rather, is he who believes in God, the Last Day, the Angels, the Book ( i.e., all
revealed Books) and the prophets (and) who gives of his wealth, despite his
love for it, to his (poor) kinsmen, to orphans, to the indigent, to the way farer,
to those who ask for financial help, and for the freeing of captives and slaves;
he who establishes prayers and pays zakat – tax, those who keep their pacts
when they make them and are steadfast in adversity, tribulation and in war –
such are the people of truth, the God-fearing”.
Islam, as evidenced by its basic sources, the Qur’an and the
Sunnah, places great importance on the acquisition of knowledge
and of moral acts. The Qur’an (35:28) not only equates man’s ability
to truly fear God with the possession of knowledge, but also locates
morality as the core of both knowledge and belief in God. For the
former, the Qur’an (17: 85; 12:76) or example, warns scholars against
pride, for knowledge has no limit, and it is only a little of it that is
vouchsafed by God to man, while above every man of knowledge
there is one who knows more, The All-Knowing (God). As for the
latter, the Qur’an (2:25 and many other verses) repeatedly uses the
expression, “those who believe and do good works”, which means
that the first, namely, the believers would not be true believers without
possessing the qualifications of the second, which are good deeds,
and vice versa.
The purpose of knowledge in Islam is to attain the Truth (i.e.,
God), whereas the purpose of ethics is to behave in accordance
with this Truth (i.e., God’s law). Therefore, ethics has been the main
interest of Muslims since it deals with the fundamental nature of all
actions in Islam, and by extension, the nature of the Islamic law
(shari‘ah). To put it another way, ethics for a Muslim are the practical
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implications of his faith in God.  All his actions and activities are
judged as acts of obedience or disobedience to God.
According to the Qur’an, It is ethics that enables man to fulfil
the purpose of his creation: “I have not created the jinn and man
except to worship Me” (al-Qur’an 51; 56), and it is ethics that
distinguishes man from his fellow man, though otherwise they would
enjoy the same status: “Surely the noblest of you, in the sight of
God, is the most righteous of you” (al-Qur’an 49:13), and another
Qur’anic verse reads, “He who created death and life, that He may
try you which of you is best in action” (al-Qur’an 67:2). In the
Hadith literature (Muhammad ‘Ali n.d: 337-392), we find such
sayings of the Prophet as, “the most perfect of the believers in faith
is the best of them in conduct” and “the best among you are the best
in character”.
The emphasis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah on acquiring
knowledge and on acting morally, which together constitute the
purpose of man’s creation has stimulated the Muslim to look to the
Qur’an and the Sunnah for overall moral and social guidance.
Naturally therefore, the Qur’an and the Sunnah become the ultimate
sources for Muslim ethics, since moral life for the Muslim is
essentially a religious life.  Similarly, ethical inquiry also starts with
the study of every aspect of Islamic religious teachings, since ethics
occupies the central place as the core of Islam.
For further studies on Qur’anic ethics, see M. Daud Rahbar
1960, God of Justice: A Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur’an,
Leiden: E.J. Brill; Izutsu, T. 1966, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the
Qur’an, Montreal: McGill University Press; Muhammad Darraz
1985, Dustur al-Akhlaq fi’l-Qur’an, Beirut: Mu’assassa al-Risala;
George F. Hourani 1985, “Ethical Presuppositions of the Qur’an”,
in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 23-48; Frederik M. Denny 1985, “Ethics and
the Qur’an:  Community and World View” in Ethics in Islam, edited
by R.G. Hovannisian, California: Undena Publications, pp. 103-
121; and Fazlur Rahman 1983, “Some Key Ethical Concepts of the
Qur’an”, The Journal of Religious Ethics, 11, pp. 170-185.
ISLAMIC LITERATURE ON ETHICS
Islamic literature on ethics, however, began to take clearer shape in
the 8th and 9th centuries AD with the study of the principles of the
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Qur’an and the Sunnah by Muslim jurists (fuqaha’), theologians
(mutakallimun), sufis (sufiyyun), and other scholars. The works on
adab (good manners), makarim al-akhlaq (noble qualities of
character), and those on the concepts of justice (al-‘adl) and moral
obligation such as Risala fi’l-Qadar by Hasan al-Basri (d. 786),
‘Uyun al-Akhbar by Ibn Qutayba (d. 889), Kitab Makarimal-Akhlaq
by Ibn Abi al-Dunya (d. 894), al-Mughni fi Abwab al-Tawhid wa’ l-
‘Adl by al-Qadi  ‘Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025), Adab al-Dunya wa’l-Din
by al-Mawardi (d. 1058),  al-Akhlaq wa’l-Siyar by Ibn Hazm (d.
1064),   Mizan al-‘Amal by Imam al-Ghazali (d. 1111),  which have
embodied the successive efforts in the field of religious ethics in
Islam – offer a remarkable and profound discussion on the concept
and content of Islamic ethical principles. It is clear that they are
original in Islam due to the fact that they not only demonstrate the
extent to which they utilise the Qur’an and the Sunnah, but they
also owe almost nothing to the Greek tradition (Hourani 1985: 21).
They pioneered, we would say, the early inquiries about the subject
and laid the foundations for more detailed enterprises for the Muslims
later on.
Philosophical ethics (‘ilm al-akhlaq) or moral philosophy in
Islam, begins with the introduction of Greek sciences and philosophy,
roughly after the first half of 9th century A.D., to the Muslim scholars
who were particularly interested in Greek philosophy. Thus, the
Qur’anic notion of happiness – which is conditional upon the
improvement of the human soul by means of ethico-religious
practices – was gradually supplemented by the Aristotelian idea of
eudaimonia and also by the Platonic tripartition of the soul (See,
Rosenthal 1990; Walzer, 1962; and O’Leary, 1949). Yet even these
Greek theories of ethics, were extended and used in many ways,
especially by the early writers on Islamic ethics including al-Kindi
(d. 874), al-Farabi (d. 950), Miskawayh (d. 1030), al-Ghazali (d.
1111), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274), Jalal al-Din al-Dawwani (d.
1502) and many others.
The Aristotelian conception of happiness, for instance, was
given a fuller and deeper meaning by extending it to the whole of
human society and also to the happiness of this world, and more
especially, to the future world (Miskawayh, 1966:, 15-18, 75-104;
al-Ghazali 1978: pp. 155-156, 160-165, 183-190, 192-202; and al-
Tusi 1964: 59-73). On the other hand, Plato’s trichotomy of the
soul was systematically connected with the Aristotelian idea of virtue
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as a mean between two vices (i.e., extremes). Also, vices were
additionally viewed as diseases of the soul and were treated in
considerable detail by the Muslim philosophers. All these matters
present a fresh approach in what was previously lacking in Greek
philosophy.
However, early Muslim discussions on philosophical ethics,
for examples, by al-Kindi (d. 873) Risala fi’l-Hila li-Daf‘ al-Ahzan,
by Abu Zakarriya’ al-Razi (d. 925), al-Tibb al-Ruhani, by al-Farabi
(d. 950), Fusul Muntaza‘a fi‘ ‘Ilm al-Akhlaq, and others did not
attain to the status of a discipline, though invariably serving as an
introduction to their wider implications for politics and law, and
also offering the new way of looking at ethics specifically in bringing
the health of the soul.
Miskawayh (d. 1030), however, through his chief ethical
treatise, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq was the first Muslim thinker to work out
a very clear, and in many respects, a thorough analytical system of
Islamic ethics. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), as has been brought out by a
number of writers on his ethical thought, incorporated the greater
part of Miskawayh’s treatise, especially in the third book of his
Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din (Muhammad Abul Quasem, 1975: 40-41; Zaki
Mubarak n.d. 56-60; and Muhammad ‘Umaruddin 1970: 56-57).
While Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1964: 25-26), admitted that his main
work on ethics, Akhlaq al-Nasiri, was based primarily on that of
Miskawayh. Then Jalal al-Din al-Dawwani (d. 1502), in turn, also
used the present Tahdhib al-Akhlaq when writing his Akhlaq al-
Jalali (Walzer, 1962: 232).
Miskawayh’s ethical work was thus occupying a prominent
place in this particular branch of Islamic ethical literature. It is
scarcely an exaggeration to say that most of the later works that
deal with this subject use it as their main authority and some of
them are even based on it. Hence, we may state provisionally, that
philosophical ethics in Islam is, in effect, the story of Miskawayh’s
Tahdhib al-Akhlaq. Accordingly, a close examination of this
important or perhaps unique compendium is indispensable for a
proper understanding of Islamic ethical thought. Here are the brief
outlines of Miskawayh’s Tahdhib al-Akhlaq:
i. The Principle of Ethics: the Soul and its Faculties, namely, the
Rational, the Irascible and the Concupiscent; the Good and
Happiness; Virtues and Vices.
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ii. Character and its Refinement: Human Perfection and its Means.
iii. The Good and Happiness.
iv. Moral Virtues: Justice.
v. Love and Friendship: The Ways towards Moral Virtues or
Justice.
vi. Vices: The Diseases of the Soul, their Causes and Remedy.
For further studies on the ethical philosophy of this great Muslim
moralist, Miskawayh, see for example, the present author’s works,
Miskawayh’s Ethical Thought and Its Sources, (Bangi: Faculty of
Islamic Studies, National University of Malaysia, 2003); Christian
and Muslim Ethics: A Study of how to Attain Happiness as Reflected
in the Works on Tahdhib al-Akhlaq by Yahya Ibn ‘Adi (d. 974) and
Miskawayh (d. 1030) (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka,
2003); and Miskawayh’s Theory of Self-Purification and the
Relationship between Philosophy and Sufism. Journal of Islamic
Studies, Oxford (1994), 5, 1: 35-51). There are also other important
studies on the ethics of Miskawayh such as those by ‘Abdul Haq
Ansari (1964), The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawayh, (Aligarh:
Aligarh Muslim University Press); and by ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ‘Izzat (1964),
Ibn Miskawayh: Falsafatuhu al-Akhlaqiyyah wa-Masadiruha. (Cairo:
Maktabah Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi).
On other important and recent studies on Islamic ethics in
general, see for example, D.M. Donaldson (1953), Studies in Muslim
Ethics, (London: SPCK); Majid Fakhri (1991), Ethical Theories in
Islam, (Leiden: E.J. Brill), and al-Fikr al-Akhlaqi al-‘Arabi, 2 vols.
(Beirut: al-Ahliyyah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi‘, 1978); Sayyed
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (1976), Islam: The Concept of Religion
and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality, (Malaysia: Muslim Youth
Movement of Malaysia); Abu ‘Ala al-Mawdudi (1967), Ethical
Viewpoint of Islam, translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad,
(Lahore: Islamic Publicatins); Toshihiko Izutzu (2004), Ethico-
Religious Concepts in the Qur’an, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book
Trust); S.N.H. Naqvi (1981), Ethics and Economic: An Islamic
Sythesis, (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation); G.F. Hourani (1985),
Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); and R.G. Hovannisian (edited: 1985), Ethics in
Islam, (California: Undena Publications). While on the individual
muslim writers on ethics see, A.J. Abberry (1950), The Spiritual
Physic of Rhazes. (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd.); M.S.H.
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Ma‘asumi (1978), Imam Razi’s ‘Ilm al-Akhlaq, (New Delhi: Kitab
Bhavan); G.F. Hourani (1971), Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of
‘Abd al-Jabbar, (Oxford: Clarendon Press); M. ‘Umaruddin (1970),
The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali, (Lahore: Shykh Muhammad
Ashraf); M.A.Quasem (1975), The Ethics of al-Ghazali: A Composite
Ethics in Islam, (Malaysia: Central Printing Sendirian Berhad); W.F.
Thompson (1839), Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan
People, (London: Allen & Co.); G.M. Wickens (1964), The Naserean
Ethics, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.); and others.
CONCLUSION
In Islam, ethics (akhlaq) is inseparable from religion and is built
entirely upon it. Naturally, therefore, the ethical teachings of the
Qur’an and the Sunnah become the ultimate sources for Muslim
ethics. The books on adab (good manners) and makarim al-akhlaq
(noble qualities of character), which have embodied the earliest
works in the field of ethics in Islam demonstrate the extant to which
they utilize the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Philosophical ethics or
moral philosophy in Islam, on the other hand, starts with the
introduction of the Muslim philosophers to Greek philosophy after
the first haft of the 9th century A.D. However, early Muslim
discussions on ethics, such as those by al-Kindi (d. 874), al-Farabi
(d. 950), Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and others, did not attain to the status
of a discipline though invariably serving as an introduction or
preface to their wider implications for politics, law and other fields
of knowledge. Miskawayh (d. 1030), through his famous ethical
work on ethics, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, was the first Muslim moralist
to have separated ethics from other disciplines, offering a very
thorough analytical system of Islamic ethics. Such an ethical work
of Miskawayh was thus occupying a prominent place in this
particular branch of Islamic ethical literature up to the present day.
Most of the latter works that deal with ethics such as those by al-
Ghazali (m.1111), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (m. 1274) and al-Dawwani
(m. 1502) are based on it. Thus, a close examination of
Miskawayh’s Tahdhib al-Akhlaq is indispensable for a proper
understanding of ethical thought in Islam.
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